Hume’s doctrine of necessity states that every occurrence in the natural world results from a sequence of causal effects: “it is universally allowed that matter, in all its operations, is actuated by a necessary force and that every natural effect is so precisely determined by the energy of its cause that no other effect, in such particular circumstances, could possibly have resulted from it” (524). Hume believes that everything that happens is precisely determined by its causes, and concludes further that everyone agrees upon this explanation of occurrences. For example, no one would deny that a billiard ball’s movement is precisely caused by the laws of physics and the force and direction of the ball that impacts it. Given this conclusion that every observable action occurs in the same manner, Hume goes on to include even human behavior under his doctrine of necessity. Just as the causality of a billiard ball’s movement depends upon “the constant and regular conjunction of similar events,” so too can human behavior be explained: “it is universally acknowledged that there is great uniformity among the actions of men… the same motives always produce the same actions. The same events follow from the same causes” (523). Our own causal histories determine our behaviors, just as the causal histories of every other object in the world determines their behavior.
Hume admits that many philosophers may attempt to deny that our actions are causally necessary, claiming instead that we possess a perfectly free choice over our behavior, unaffected by any causal influences. Ultimately, however, Hume concludes, that, “they dissent in words only, not in their real sentiment” (527). He quickly dismisses any denial of causality by explaining that we do consistently ascribe it: “even the characters which are peculiar to each individual have a uniformity in their influence” (524). This comment suggests that even when people behave in ways that seem inexplicable, totally out of character, or without any cause, there still are causes behind those decisions; he describes that these causes arise simply from “the secret operation of contrary causes… on exact scrutiny, a contrariety of effects always betrays a contrariety of causes” (525). To clarify this point still further, Hume offers the example of the weather: we cannot always predict the weather perfectly because we cannot see all the causes clearly (the wind currents, pressure systems, etc.), but this does not mean that there are no causes, for certainly there are (525).
Hume begins his discussion of the doctrine of liberty with the same conclusion of his doctrine of necessity: that everyone already accepts this view.[1] Hume defines his doctrine of liberty as “the power of acting or not acting according to the determinations of the will” (528). But could we really have this power given the doctrine of necessity, which Hume has already established that everybody holds? If all human behavior is causally determined, how could we have the power to choose our behavior, for it seems utterly determined? And what does that suggest about our moral responsibility?
In order to see the compatibility of the doctrines of necessity and liberty, we must pay careful attention to Hume’s precise definition of liberty: “the power of acting or not acting according to the determinations of the will” (528). The liberty he really cites here refers to our ability or inability to physically execute the will’s determinations. This version of liberty does not imply that we have power over the actual determination at which our will arrives. Thus Hume ends up locating our liberty in a slightly different place than the more typical Libertarian views. As opposed to locating our freedom in our choice of behavior, Hume locates our freedom in our very ability to behave. On this view, we end up with a sort of physical liberty, where we are free either to act or not to act according to the causal determination of the will; he phrases this version of liberty as a hypothetical, “if we choose to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move, we also may” (528). If we are able to carry out our (causally determined) decision, then we are free with respect to that decision. Thus Hume concludes that nearly everyone both possesses and endorses this liberty: “this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to everyone who is not a prisoner and in chains. Here then is no subject of dispute” (528). Clearly, on Hume’s version of freedom, the doctrines of necessity and liberty are in fact compatible: our decisions are determined, but our power to either execute or not to execute those decisions comprises our freedom.
How then are we to understand responsibility? How is it that both the doctrine of necessity and of liberty necessarily contribute to the grounding of our responsibility? The most basic way of understanding Hume’s version of our responsibility consists in the idea of social function. Even though our behavioral decisions are determined purely by our causal history, our executions of those decisions are still understood by everybody as an action attributable to the person. Hume expresses his views about the social functionality of attributing social function when he says, “all laws being founded on rewards and punishments, it is supposed as a fundamental principle that these motives have a regular and uniform influence on the mind and both produce the good and prevent evil actions” (529). Thus, laws are meant to insert new factors into the causal chain of our will’s determinations in order to direct the population toward prosocial behavior. This idea that laws influence our behavioral decisions presupposes the causal regularity of our will’s determinations, as Hume identifies: “we may give to this influence [of laws on behavior] what name we please; but, as it is usually conjoined with the action, it must be esteemed a cause and be looked upon as an instance of that necessity which we would here establish” (529). In presupposing the causal influence of laws (and social norms), Hume clearly describes the doctrine of necessity as fundamental to our ascriptions of responsibility.
Liberty is equally essential to ascriptions of responsibility. Hume proves this claim “easily” when he explains, “as actions are objects of our moral sentiment only so far as they are indications of the internal character, passions, and affections, it is impossible that they can give rise either to praise or blame where they do not proceed from these principles, but are derived altogether from external violence” (530). Perhaps we do not actually have responsibility over our actions, for they result from a causal determination of the will. But insofar as the free execution of the will’s determination externally represents the inner character or habits of a person, and insofar as the executions of those decisions affect other people, society does ascribe responsibility to persons in order both to foster prosocial and to prevent antisocial behaviors.
The problem with Hume’s theory of freedom is that it contradicts our powerful and commonly asserted intuition that we are perfectly free. Such perfect freedom typically refers to an agential liberty – one where we have an absolute freedom to make our own decisions independently of causal or external influences. Put simply, Hume’s version of liberty contradicts the ubiquitous notion of a Free Will. Instead of according human beings the freedom to decide our behavior, Hume limits our liberty to a merely physical freedom. Hume concludes that we are only free with respect to a given decision, but that decision itself is determined by our causal history. If we are able to execute our decision, we are free; if we are unable to execute our decision, we are not free. This version of liberty actually seems to locate our freedom physically outside of ourselves, and even beyond our direct control! Whether we are “free” or not will depend upon the conditions of our corporeal body in the physical world. If we are physically restrained by some external force (as the prisoner is in Hume’s example), then we are not free to act; if we are not physically restrained, then we are free to act. But on this view, we essentially have no control over our freedom.
Does this even qualify as liberty? It seems a highly unfavorable consequence that Hume’s account of liberty requires us to abandon the view of ourselves as always and perfectly free. If we do not have freedom over our decisions, then it seems we do not really have freedom at all. Instead, Hume seems to be using the word “freedom” or “liberty” to describe a condition merely of “absence from physical restraint or limitation.” But in no way does “absence of physical restraint” resemble the ideal of liberty that man typically asserts himself to possess; in no way does “absence of physical restraint” resemble a perfectly free will. Thus it seems that Hume’s “freedom” really represents some highly diluted version of the libertarian ideal we typically claim ourselves to possess.
Hume would easily respond to this objection by reiterating his original argument. Who cares if we “want” to have a Free Will; who cares if we “feel like” or “intuit that” we have this freedom to decide our behavior? We simply do not have freedom over our decisions. Our determinations of will are causally determined. If one thinks carefully about this view, it becomes very difficult to deny effectively. For does it not in fact seem that every experience we have lived through, every sentiment or value we have come to hold, and every predisposition or habit we tend to exhibit are what really factor into our behavioral decisions? Our will’s final determination in any case may feel like an exertion of an authoritative, agential, free will; but really, that decision is determined by all of these influences or causes collecting within us that comprise our own causal history. Even if we “decide” to act totally out of character for the sake of asserting our own free will, that very decision will be constituted or determined by some sort of causal influence, like, for example, a desire not to conform, or perhaps because earlier in the day you felt inspired by your friend acting totally uniquely. Even if we do not know the causes influencing our decisions, the causes do exist. This is precisely analogous to Hume’s weather example described above.
A person who wishes to locate freedom in our very decisions must commit himself to a number of other philosophical tenets that Hume rejects. If we are to have the sort of agential, decision-making liberty that so many claim we do have, then we must hold the idea of a persistent and overarching self. Hume denies the existence of such an identity (as described in my first paper). Furthermore, they will be forced to maintain a very challenging metaphysics of causation; their view will have to explain that some things operate causally, while others do not. In other words, they will need to describe a significant and real difference between the way that matter operates in the world causally, and the way that we human beings behave independently of any causation. At a closer look, Hume firmly concludes that such an explanation will be impossible and inaccurate.
In the end, Hume’s view represents a very appealing compatibilism between two highly disputed doctrines of liberty and necesity. As he continually explains, we do believe in the doctrine of necessity and causality, and we do believe in the doctrine of liberty and freedom. How are we to reconcile these two apparently contradictory and yet simultaneously maintained explanations of the world? Hume provides an answer. Hume manages not only to better explain each of the doctrines independently, but also to provide a solution for how we ought rationally to maintain both at the same time. He even goes the further step to explain that this reconciliation of causal determination and individual liberty proves essential to the maintenance of our own moral responsibility (another highly important and ubiquitously maintained philosophical commitment). Thus Hume’s “reconciling project” proves to settle one of the most essential and highly debated topics of human philosophy.
12/9/09
[1] This is a very bold claim for Hume to make, having just proven that everyone affirms the doctrine of necessity, for it implies that everybody holds both determinism and libertarianism – two views that nearly everybody claims to contradict or fundamentally oppose one another.
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