I. The Self is not an atomistic soul.
- What is soul atomism?
- Where does soul atomism come from?
- Why is soul atomism wrong?
- What does this tell us, initially, about Nietzsche’s own thoughts?
II. If not an atomistic soul, then what?
- Does he mean to reject the soul?
- What would a soul be if not atomistic?
- A non-atomistic soul is not unprecedented.
III. What is a drive?
- How are we to understand a drive?
- Deeper than desires.
- More than instincts.
IV. Why is this a better description of the soul than an atomistic account?
- The soul and values are preserved!
- An example: Nietzsche’s analysis of philosophers.
- Interpretive framework: micro- and macro-levels of analysis.
V. Problem of Homunculi?
- Is this a problem?
- Dennett’s resolution.
VI. How do the drives behave?
- Drives are selfishly motivated.
- They have a Will to Power.
VII. What sort of arrangement best describes the set of drives?
- Drives are politically ordered.
- How do they get to be like this?
- Wolf-pack analogy.
VIII. Philosophical upshot of understanding the drives as ordered politically?
- Interpretive strategy.
- Nietzsche’s criticisms of human society à criticism of drive behavior.
- A way for understanding Nietzsche’s ideal man.
“To say that a piece or kind of behavior is to be explained in terms of a drive is to say that the organism is set up in such a way that, given the presence of certain internal and external cues or stimuli, it is caused to behave in ways that tend to have certain results, precisely the results that are the drives’ objects or ends (such as ingesting food in the case of the drive to eat), and that no judgment concerning the goodness of these ends need enter into the process that leads to the behavior” (222).
 One might wonder what the relationship between the soul and the self is for the soul atomists. Human beings are selves. What makes this selfhood possible? The soul atomist explains that each of us is a self precisely because we each also have a soul. The self and the soul are not identical. Instead, the soul is an independent essence we have that makes it possible for each of us to think of ourselves as a self. Here we can see another way that the soul distinguishes humans from animals, for animals certainly do not have self-consciousness in the way that human beings do. We do have selves, but what makes that self-identity possible is that we have souls.
 This might make one wonder whether we ought to reassess our resolution of the problem of homunculi, for a political order seems like a quite sophisticated human relationship that might too closely resemble full human persons for the drives still to qualify as much simpler proto-persons. Here we must note that Nietzsche only means to describe an analogy for how we ought best to understand the drives’ organizationgiven their basic psychological makeup: a will to the power to enforce their own behavioral patterns. With this analogy, nothing ought to change in the way we understand each individual drives; only our image of their resultant social order is now more developed.
Clark, Maudemarie, and David Dudrick. "Nietzsche on the Will: An Analysis of BGE 19." Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy. Comp. Ken Gemes and Simon May. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2009. 247-69. Print.
Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm. Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future. Trans. R. J. Hollingdale. London: Penguin, 2003. Print.
Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm. On the Genealogy of Morality. Trans. Maudemarie Clark and Alan J. Swensen. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Pub. Co, 1998. Print.
Clark, Maudemarie and David Dudrick. Nietzsche's Magnificent Tension of the Spirit: An Introduction to Beyond Good and Evil. Cambridge University Press.
Katsafanas, Paul. “Grounding Ethics in Philosophical Psychology.” From his article: “Deriving Ethics from Action: A Nietzschean Version of Constitutivism.” forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research and available at: http://www.unm.edu/~katsafan/publications.htm.