What initially leads the audience to alarm is Nietzsche’s vague phrasing of “the basic drives of mankind” that “have all at one time or other practiced philosophy.” When one thinks of the basic drives, any number of concepts come to mind: the drive for sustenance, the drive for reproduction, the selfish drives of greed and pride. If Nietzsche were referring to pride or greed, clearly he would be announcing that the basis of philosophy is to be suspected – insofar as true knowledge would have been neither the aim nor the outcome of any philosophical theory. And yet, could we not imagine a different set of basic drives to which Nietzsche may be referring? Could it not be that Nietzsche is providing us with a more effective way to understanding philosophical theories, by explaining that every philosophical theory is an effort to satisfy some more profound basic human need? By examining philosophical texts in this way, we are now given a new set of criteria for judging the veracity of philosophical theories entirely based upon the connection between the philosopher’s most essential drive and the outcome of his theory. Under these new criteria it seems that a theory fails if its author does not embody its conclusions – for in this way, the philosopher would merely be trying to fulfill an imagined basic human drive, as opposed to actually fulfilling his own human drive and therefore an actual human desire. Let us investigate some theories, and then try and discover to what extent each philosopher embodies his work.
Kant’s theory of morality, as established in his Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, begins with the assertion that the only thing “which can be regarded as good without qualification [is a] good will” (page 7). Kant goes on to conclude that the good will is that which is always in accord with the Categorical Imperative. Kant deduces three essentially synonymous formulations of the Categorical Imperative: 1) “act only according to the maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law” (page 30); 2) “Act in such a way that you treat humanity… always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means” (page 36); 3) “A rational being belongs to the kingdom of ends as a member when he legislates in it universal laws while also being himself subject to these laws” (page 40). Thus Kant’s most valued person is one who decides every maxim of action based upon a consideration of the Categorical Imperative. Such an individual would be one characterized by strict adherence to moral law and exhibiting a rigorous commitment to determining the most ethical maxim through considering universality.
Hegel’s ideal differs from Kant’s in that his seems to be less of a moral ideal. In his Phenomenology of the Spirit, Hegel examines various aspects humanity as people attempt to locate themselves in the world. In this work, Hegel rationally observes the different conditions of human beings in general and their approaches to reality, and he systematically moves from one to the next – always tending toward his ultimate ideal (though we do not know what that ideal is explicitly until he reaches it in the end). He begins with an examination of Consciousness where the essence of reality is considered to be objects in the external world. When Consciousness fails, he moves on to examine Self-Consciousness, where truth is thought to be found only in the self. This theory fails as well, but it brings Hegel to his final theoretical approach: Reason. It is here that we come to see Hegel’s ideal: where “Reason is Spirit when its certainty of being all reality has been raised to truth, and it is conscious of itself as its own world, and of the world as itself” (#438). Put differently, Hegel’s ultimate ideal is the integration of the individual with the community, where everyone knows himself to be an embodiment of Spirit, which exists in both the individual and in itself. Knowing himself to be Spirit, he is also able to find real connection between himself and essentially every aspect of existence – insofar as Spirit is everywhere and in everything. Thus, Hegel’s ideal seems to be one not characterized by the sort of rigorous adherence to any law, as in Kant’s; instead, the model for Hegel is a person who has come to possess a transcendent or complete understanding of the world and all that is included within it.
Schopenhauer’s morality, in his The World as Will and Representation, appears at first to be one of compassion, where the only criterion of good is one’s intention to help ease the suffering of others. He arrives at this first conclusion through a development of the idea of the Will as reality. He agrees with Kant that our experience of objects is entirely limited to appearances, because we can only experience objects through our own concepts of Time, Space, and Causality. However, Schopenhauer does conclude that there is one thing which we can know in itself: our own wills. Having established this, he goes on to say that we can project the idea of the will upon the entire world, and in this way we can understand the world as a thing in itself. Because everything is essentially will, Schopenhauer concludes that everything is fundamentally connected; therefore, the pain of another is really one’s own pain. Thus, compassion arises as the necessary morality, where one assumes everyone’s suffering and tries to alleviate it. However, this task of mitigating suffering is so great that it is ultimately to be abandoned. Therefore, Schopenhauer ultimately concludes that the only value of life is to realize that life has no value. As a result, Schopenhauer’s ideal person becomes one who actively opposes the will’s influence over him. His model becomes the ascetic, who has come to know the truth of reality – that happiness is impossible – and who has realized that one is left only with the choice of denying the will as an active rebellion against the inevitable dissatisfaction caused by it.
Having established the most basic outline of each philosopher’s ideal, we must now address the question as to whether they embody their professed archetypes. If they truly are an embodiment of their ideal, then their moral theory succeeds insofar as it exists as a fulfillment of a basic human drive. And yet how are we to determine each philosopher’s character? It seems to me that our most reliable source would be the philosopher’s own voice as related to us in the works themselves. By examining not the content, but style of each work, not the ideal at all, but the voice, we can learn something about each author as an individual and thus as a hierarchy of desires. Finally, after deciding whether or not the embodiment aligns with the ideal, we can conclude that their ideals were motivated by a specific desire. The only remaining step is then to determine what that desire was.
Kant’s construction of his theoretical works is almost painfully logical. One can see this most clearly in his Critique of Pure Reason, where every single word is deliberate and clearly carefully considered. As a result, the writing ends up as rather cut and dry, very straightforward and no-nonsense. Even when he speculates, he provides a firm and rationally sound basis for such speculation. As we return to consider the character of his ideal person, it seems that the two really do coincide. His ideal person is one committed to rigorous employment of reason – and Kant clearly approaches his philosophical theories as such. His ideal person is one who thoroughly understands the requirements of the Categorical Imperative as a moral law, and clearly Kant does understand this. Indeed, in his examples throughout his Grounding, Kant seems to remove himself entirely from any sort of compassion or moral feeling – for example, his discussion of the supposed right to lie does not permit any sort of feeling of compassion, but only a reasoned consideration of the required universality of maxims. Thus, it is fair to conclude that Kant represents his own ideal, for his voice in at least two of his works is clearly the voice of the person committed to moral law as determined by reason.
Having concluded that Kant does represent his own ideal, we must next inquire as to what drive motivated his theoretical conclusions. By determining this drive, we will see how it ultimately addresses and fulfills a basic human need and therefore succeeds as a theory. Kant’s ideal is a person who seems merely to have found himself existing in a world about which he can know nothing in itself. Furthermore, this person has also found that he possesses a peculiar faculty, that of reason. Thus we have a person in an unavoidable situation but who at the same time holds a tool for helping him to live. Thus, we find as motivation behind Kant’s conclusions about morality a fundamental desire to cope with our existence. It is as if he has decided, “well, this is the way things are, so we might as well make the best of it by putting our reason to use.”
For Hegel it appears a bit trickier to determine whether he embodies his own ideal. But let us begin with a look at the way that his Phenomenology is composed. The most characteristic feature of the construction of this work is without a doubt its carefully considered ordering. Hegel knows where he must start when considering humanity’s approach to reality, and he knows why he ought to start there – i.e. because Consciousness is the most basic approach, and, when it fails, it leads logically into Self-Consciousness. Again, Self-Consciousness fails and what naturally follows from it is Reason. Thus, Hegel’s understanding of humanity and its basic functions is vastly comprehensive. By looking at the world rationally, he is able to compose an entirely rational and goal-oriented work. He does not write in an analytic or purely logical fashion, as did Kant; but instead seems to be offering only his personal observations supported by both observed and reasoned evidence. Thus, by the sheer comprehensiveness of his understanding of human beings and their various approaches and implicit aims, Hegel seems actually to have attained, to a certain extent, the kind of full understanding present in his ideal person. His very ability to explain the mode of relation between the individual and the Unchangeable, speaks to the likelihood that he himself has at the very least approached such a reconciliation, if not found it completely.
Hegel’s motivating drive differs entirely from Kant’s desire to cope with existence. Instead, Hegel’s most fundamental drive seems to be more of a desire to reconcile our existence in the world. Hegel does not set out to explain how we ought to live, but instead sets out to explain how we can locate ourselves within this world. He wants to explain that we do not just seem to find ourselves here in a world about which we can truly know nothing; but ultimately we belong in this world, as we are the very embodiments of the Spirit which is the world. Thus Hegel’s work is an effort to help people understand that their existence is not merely accidental and one that might as well be made the best of (as in Kant’s), but that their existence is one characterized by themselves.
Schopenhauer is perhaps the most difficult of the three to prove as an embodiment of his own ideal, and here it seems necessary that we approach him in the opposite direction – i.e. start with the desire behind his ideal, and then deduce whether or not he could potentially embody that desire. Assuming his ideal does respond to a real and basic human drive (i.e. assuming that Schopenhauer is fundamentally characterized by this drive), his ideal seems to be motivated entirely by a desire to revolt against the existence in which we find ourselves. Can we find such a desire within his writing? If not, perhaps we will have to look also at what we know about him as a person.
Schopenhauer’s World as Will and Representation can be characterized best by its sensuous appeal. His similes and metaphors are vivid and illuminating. His discussion of aesthetics harkens images and sounds to mind and causes one to find freedom from the will even within one’s own imagination. And yet, his ultimate ideal is one of asceticism. Would an ascetic really use such appealing descriptions, and spend so much time considering the pleasures of the arts? It seems highly unlikely, and thus we have some cause for concern as to whether Schopenhauer really does embody his ideal. We find greater concern in the knowledge of his penchant for sensuous delights – he centered his life around pleasures, parties, and good company. Thus, must we conclude that Schopenhauer’s philosophy has failed? Is it only an imagined drive that he has attempted to fulfill, and not a real one?
At this point, we must return to the desire to revolt, and move away from considering whether he has fulfilled the ascetic ideal. For the ascetic ideal represents only an attempt by Schopenhauer to achieve such a rebellion of existence – and perhaps it is merely one mode of rebellion, of many. Perhaps Schopenhauer personally satisfies his desire to revolt by a different route than asceticism. Could it not be that his consumption of the world is a type of rebellion in itself? As if he were saying, “having found myself to exist in this world and having found myself to be subject to the Will, I will take it upon myself to consciously use its contents for my own pleasure, even beyond the extent to which the Will urges me.” If this is the case, does his theory of asceticism fail? Certainly not, for Schopenhauer does embody the desire that motivated his ascetic theory, though he does not embody the one particular ideal in his work. In other words, the basic human drive that led him to his ascetic ideal is real, as proven by the fact that he does embody a form of revolt. With this understanding of the basic drive, Schopenhauer it seems would be able to compose multiple theories for the satisfaction of that goal. Indeed, his very composing of the ascetic ideal represents a revolt in itself against the Will, insofar as he has now offered to even more people an option for rebellion.
Through analyzing these three philosophers according to the new way provided by Nietzsche, we are able to understand their theories as succeeding in a different sense than previously considered. No longer do we see philosophers only as trying to establish the most accurate theory of our understanding of the world according to a “drive to knowledge.” Instead, we can now understand a slightly different purpose behind each work – that of satisfying a basic human drive, a basic human approach to the world that perhaps previously had not found a way to be satisfied. By offering ideals, these philosophers are providing solutions to peoples’ predisposed approaches to the world. This approach to philosophy seems to coincide with Nietzsche’s approach to life in general – where, as seen in The Gay Science, responsibility for coming to conclusions about existence and reality is placed upon the individual. Every person is moved by a different hierarchy of drives, and thus, the philosopher’s job becomes that of offering ways in which those drives, at the individual level, can be accomplished.
5/8/08
A few somewhat relevent links (personality tests)
http://www.colorquiz.com
http://www.similarminds.com/embj.html
http://www.similarminds.com/personality_tests.html
http://www.colorquiz.com
http://www.similarminds.com/embj.html
http://www.similarminds.com/personality_tests.html
No comments:
Post a Comment