Long Run Sustainability through Omnilateral Action

There have been many recent philosophical attempts to limit our reckless treatment of the environment. Generally, philosophers opt for one of two different approaches to this issue: an appeal to the ideal ethical behavior of individuals, or an appeal to the duties of society. The individual level encourages people to reevaluate their consumption-driven behavior, and to recognize that a better and more satisfying life is one lived more simply. The consequence of many individuals reducing consumption, these philosophers say, will be a more sustainable overall relationship with the environment. Philosophers who focus on the societal level argue that multilateral, cooperative efforts are the only effective means of reducing our negative impacts on the environment. They conclude that we have a collective duty to establish global cooperative agreements where better treatment of the earth will be enforced.

In his “Economic Consumption, Pleasure, and the Good Life,” Phillip Cafaro adopts an approach based on the individual. He indirectly approaches the issue of human beings’ negative impact on the climate through an ethical investigation of the ideal life. Cafaro begins by comparing our modern lives (as determined by economics), to the good life (as formulated by ancient virtue-ethicists). Cafaro characterizes modern economics as a system that “generally equate[s] increased consumption and wealth with a better life” (476). At the individual level, Cafaro explains, economics is a problematically “preference neutral” theory, where no one person’s desires are any better or worse than anyone else’s. At the broader social level, economics promotes growth and development, with “a strong bias in favor of ‘more is better’” (478). Thus, Cafaro sums up the overall consequence of modern economics’ values where “Increased consumption… literally cannot be bad” (478).

Ultimately, Cafaro takes issue with this modern society and claims, “such preference neutrality, however, is certainly mistaken” (476), for there are higher values which ought to be taken into consideration on top of one’s own personal preferences. As an alternative, Cafaro presents the Aristotelian model of the good life. For Aristotle and other virtue-ethicists, “a human being has capacities and is capable of achievements that far outstrip those of the other animals. To ignore these possibilities and, for example, to focus solely on consuming, is to sell ourselves short” (475). Additionally, Cafaro notes a number of studies that have quantified the fact that lives directed entirely towards gaining wealth and pleasure “are not the key to happiness or personal development” (480). Cafaro does grant that “the good life includes pleasure” (475), but he goes on immediately to explain that pleasure is only one contributing factor to a good life. Instead, human beings are capable of much higher values and more fulfilling lives: “Lives devoted to personal excellence and to the pursuit of knowledge are better than lives devoted primarily to pleasure” (475).

Intuitively, there are many reasons for adopting individual actions that indirectly promote a better relationship with the environment. Firstly, Cafaro endorses decreased personal consumption as valuable in itself – i.e. an action that contributes directly to one’s own happiness and well-being. Secondly, Mark A. Burch emphasizes the instrumental value of decreased consumption when he suggests, “If voluntary simplicity were adopted by all the world’s people, it would at least be plausible to foresee a sustainable, healthy, and reasonably peaceable future for all humanity” (35). A third benefit to voluntary simplicity that Burch notes consists in the fact that individual actions can be completed immediately: “The critical decision before us is whether we voluntarily embrace the practice of simplicity now or see it involuntarily imposed by circumstances which, through neglect or denial, become self-stoking transnational emergencies that no longer allow for choice” (35). Implicitly, this value suggests that this immediacy makes the focus on the individual a better approach than an emphasis on the societal level of action.

I disagree with the above arguments as they relate to sustainability. Cafaro’s first point is of course legitimate: there is much value to be had not only from decreasing consumption, but also from reevaluating our economic society in general. Nevertheless, he seems to be prioritizing a semantic moral dilemma over an environmental crisis; this does not seem to me a very ethical prioritization. Secondly, Burch’s argument that decreased individual consumption on a massive scale will provide us the sustainability we need does not seem strong enough to me. Individuals can buy less and less, but what about massive manufacturing plants that are contributing so significantly to the pollution of the atmosphere. Additionally, it seems unlikely that any significant amount of people would voluntarily opt for this lifestyle at all. I also take issue with Burch’s third assumption that social programs will take up the environmental cause far too late, and only after a series of natural calamities. Yes, unilateral actions can be taken immediately, but I am not yet convinced that our time would not be better spent in the long run by pressing for societal, governmental change, which would affect more large-scale destructive behaviors.

My more overarching qualm with theories that focus only on individual actions is that they approach the issue of climate change indirectly. Their leading priority is that of changing peoples’ behavior on ethical grounds. According to these theorists, it is merely a fortunate bonus that we gain increased sustainability. What we really need instead is an approach that will directly address our poor treatment of the environment.

Given these issues with purely individual approaches to ethical environmental behavior, we may now examine a societal approach. Baylor Johnson likens our present treatment of the world to a Tragedy of the Commons in his essay, “Ethical Obligations in a Tragedy of the Commons.” The Tragedy of the Commons is a unique situation where many people are using up a given resource. There are three unique conditions about the ToC situation that Johnson lays out: (1) Each individual benefits from use of the commons and loses from refraining, (2) One individual’s reduced use will encourage others to increase their use, (3) There is no communication possible that might prevent aggregate harm to the resource by organizing multiple individual acts of restraint (279). These conditions do seem to hold to a certain extent in our current relationship with the environment. Thus it is clear how Johnson concludes that because there is no guarantee that others will do the same, “no one has a moral obligation to reduce use of the commons unilaterally” (282). For why would one person reduce consumption if his action will both lessen his own utility, and have none of the intended effects?

Johnson does not give up hope, but instead emphasizes a different moral obligation for individuals: “to work for a collective agreement that could avert a potential ToC” (283). By creating a formal agreement, whereby all individuals will cooperate to reduce use of the environment at the same time, society will be able to enforce and regulate an improved treatment of the earth. Only once society has adopted such a contract will individuals’ actions have any real effect – for one will then be able to reduce consumption and accept some loss in utility, in the knowledge that he has contributed to improving the environment. Thus the most pressing moral duty is for society to create such a contract.

There are a number of aspects to this approach that seem to suggest that we should adopt the societal approach over the individual approach. Firstly, built into Johnson’s argument is the fact that individual acts are simply ineffectual when dealing with such a massive issue. Secondly, this approach promotes policies that will deal directly with the issue of environmental destruction. This lines up with the idea (also present in Kates’ article) that there is simply no time to wait for indirect effects to take place, which may take generations; the crisis is imminent and we must act directly. Thirdly, once this societal obligation is accomplished, individual reductions in consumption will follow as a necessary result.

Again, I find these arguments too weak to stand up to any realistic considerations. First of all, Johnson seems too quick in ruling out the possibility and potential impact of widespread individual changes in behavior. (Granted, above I argued against this very possibility, but neither side has shown any proof!) Secondly, it does not seem certain that just because a societal policy is aimed directly at accomplishing more sustainable human behaviors, that such sustainable behaviors will be achieved. Any policymaker knows that there are always unintended effects. Thirdly, and related to this second objection, it is not at all obvious that people will embrace this top-down social policy. It seems there could potentially be serious resistance against any laws requiring a change in peoples’ established ways of life. Thus societal policy may not work at all, or take longer to work than the natural adoption of simpler living.

Overall, the societal approach does initially seem to solve some of the problems of the individual approach; nevertheless, it intuitively seems that such a societal change could never happen without a change first occurring at the level of the individual. If there is no broad base of support, how could any legislation be passed that would require such reductions in environmental usage? By the very nature of our political system, we could never expect a law representing Johnson’s cooperative agreement to be passed without a large segment of the population embracing these values in the first place.

There seems to be a fundamental and inescapable problem with these approaches, and it is clearly seen in the broad objection I have just presented above. It seems that the distinction made between individual behavior and societal duties is an inappropriate and unnecessary split of two fundamentally united aspects. For there could be no society without individuals! And how impotent individuals would be without a society! Each of these two aspects establishes and empowers the other, and to that extent, they ought not to be separated in ethical considerations.

Additionally, by emphasizing only one of these two levels, these philosophers have apparently lost sight of the fact that our destruction of the environment is an urgent global crisis that must be dealt with immediately; time spent on excessively narrow and overly reductive ethical arguments is time wasted. We simply cannot hope that focusing on a single approach will be able effect the sort of massive global change that is required for achieving environmental sustainability. What we need right now is crisis management, and not some impeccably developed or perfectly consistent ethical model. What we need right now is not unilateral or multilateral decisions, but omnilateral action!

To that end, I propose that any effort to demarcate one of these approaches as right and the other as wrong (or less important) is ethically irresponsible; what we need instead is an ethical formula that integrates the individual level with the societal level. Such a unification of these two approaches into a single, integrated theory will result in the necessary widespread and immediate change in all of our behavior – at both the individual and societal levels. Not only will this theory be far more effective in preventing any further damage to our ecosphere; but also, this theory will be far more enduring and widely accepted for its appropriate integration of individuals and society.

Lester W. Milbraith begins to approach this ideal model in his essay, “ Redefining the Good Life in a Sustainable Society.” His primary approach concerns the individual level of behavior and the good life, as seen in the title of his work; yet he adopts a much more realistic and integrated approach than any of the ones we have seen thus far. He offers an example of an apparent tension between environmental concerns over the endangered spotted owl, and the livelihood of loggers who depend upon cutting down the owls’ home forests. Milbraith’s approach to this issue begins to clarify the sense of integration he finds between the individual, society, and the ecosphere: “The central question is not whether people or spotted owls are more important; they are both important. No one is suggesting that people must die for spotted owls to live. The question, rather, is what values should have the greatest priority as such policies are made?” (201). In other words, there is no one best or most important aspect; all three must be considered as important and the final policy must depend on what is best for all three as a collective whole.

Whereas other theorists have singled out only one aspect as the primary concern, Milbraith spells out a fundamental connection between the individual, society, and the environment:

"Individuals desiring quality of life must give top priority to protection and preservation of their biocommunity (their ecosystem). Second priority must go to preservation and protection of the good functioning of their social community. Only when people are careful to protect the viability of their two communities is it acceptable for individuals to pursue quality of life according to their own personal desires. (201)"

Thus Milbraith relates the three in a hierarchical fashion, where each depends upon the one above it in order for its own flourishing. The individual cannot flourish without a functioning society, and the society cannot function without a healthy environment.

Intuitively this makes sense, though it was not quite what I had in mind. It seems to me that even a hierarchical relationship between the three is unnecessarily reductive. Instead, I would argue that the three function simultaneously, as a single cohesive unit, where the damage of one directly damages the others, and the flourishing of all contribute to the flourishing of each. Nevertheless, Milbraith is on the right track, and perhaps his theory is the closest approximation of the ideal I have in mind.

I can imagine many objections to my proposed ideal. Firstly, this sort of integration of individuals and society is a nice theory, but it could be that things simply do not work like that. There are people, and there are societies, and there is nature; all three function at the same time and in the same place, but are independently operating entities. A second and more pragmatic objection would be that even if such an ideal were an accurate characterization of the world, the achievement of such a massive integration project, where individuals and society all hop on board the sustainability train simultaneously, seems impossible. Included in this objection would be the arguments that each approach had against the other: that it is highly unlikely or impossible that people will change unless society has formed some sort of agreement or enforcement, and that it is highly unlikely or impossible that society can change without some change first happening among individuals.

While these arguments are all certainly valid, I believe I can provide sufficient responses to each of them. First of all, to claim that individuals, society, and the environment are entirely polarized and independent entities is even more absurd than to claim that they are interrelated. Here we can return to Milbraith’s conclusions – people comprise society, and society necessarily functions within the environment (for where else could it operate? This is simply the condition of our existence on Earth). Thus, a theory that unifies these three aspects seems much more realistic and much more natural a characterization of the way things actually are. In other words, the burden of proof rests on those who object to this unification, to prove that there is not a fundamental relationship between them all.

The second claim, which attacks the plausibility of such a theory being adopted, is a much more serious concern. Essentially, it seems that any change is for some reason very difficult to achieve. People are not happy with consumption and ecogluttony, but no significant amount of the population seems willing to change their behavior. Additionally, societies, governments, and social policies have proven exceptionally sluggish in their efforts. Whether that is caused by the political system, or just a general apathy or laziness, societal change does not seem to be happening. The beauty of a theory that integrates the individual level with the societal level, is that these two formerly isolated and struggling aspects would become mutually reinforcing. Instead of individuals having no hope in the possibility of societal change, and instead of society waiting for individuals to require a change in policy, we would have individuals and society acting as one cohesive unit. People would be motivated by the changes in policy to change their own behavior; while social policy changes would be reinforced and strengthened by the population’s adoption of simpler lives. Put differently, this unified theory would simply bypass the chicken-egg paradox – where one side is simply waiting for the other to act first. Both would act at once, as one.

In the end, it would turn out that change would be accomplished more easily if it occurred at both levels simultaneously, than if it occurred at each level independently. If this seems overly optimistic about real-world possibilities, I disagree. The world is in an environmental crisis, and the urgency of the situation is (or will be) strong enough to motivate this kind of simultaneous, omnilateral change. Perhaps the best part of such a theory is its ability to adopt the positive ideals of both approaches. The ideals of simpler living and the good life would become a fundamental part of both individuals’ lives and the overall social fabric. Additionally, the ideals of cooperative agreement and mutual enforcement of the necessary policies would carry over into all societal issues, and benefit everyone in the end. Ultimately, by uniting the individuals with society, and both with the environment, we would end up with a permanently sustainable existence.

5/4/09