A capacities approach to human rights, argues that the only and best way to ground human rights is in some capacity or faculty that human beings possess, like rational agency. Wolterstorff concludes that such an attempt “cannot be successful… [for] two main reasons” (Updated Chapter 13, 9). First we encounter the see-saw problem, which regards the issue of according all human beings equal human rights. As he notes, “the capacity for rational agency comes in degrees… but that violates the equal worth proviso” (9). Even after he modifies the argument to say that a person need only possess and exercise rationality to any degree in order to have human rights, Wolterstorff still thinks the account fails: for “the reason for thinking that dignity supervenes on possessing that property is the prior conviction that dignity supervenes on possessing and exercising that capacity” (10). Thus it seems we are really only left with the original issue that different people will deserve disequal human rights based on their different levels of rationality.
The second issue regards the ability of rationality as a grounding to include only humans. For it turns out that some animals of higher intelligence do in fact possess certain levels of rationality. Thus we must begin to “beef up” the rationality requirement a bit to exclude these non-human beings (10), and require more refined rational capacities like “rational moral agency, or… the capacity to form, revise, and enact a life-plan” (11). However, we run into problems here, as there are many human beings who cannot in fact accomplish these higher levels of rational function (e.g. coma patients, the severely mentally disabled, infants). Wolterstorff arrives at the final formulation that capacities proponents can claim: one must be a “member of a species whose adult properly formed members possess [rationality]” (11). Here it seems we would have all and only humans at last – but does it not seem that we have actually lost the idea of dignity as grounded in rationality? For haven’t we included many creatures which we have also admitted do not have rational capacity? Thus, Wolterstorff concludes that “every attempt to account for some equal, ineradicable, and animal-transcending dignity that we possess qua human beings confronts exactly the same problems as those confronted by the attempt to account for that dignity by reference to the capacity for rational agency” (12).
Having denied the possibility of “natural human rights” (12), Wolterstorff must now identify some alternative source of value shared by all and only humans. At this point, he enters the realm of theistic groundings of human rights based upon some sort of relationship between human beings and God. Wolterstorff begins this investigation at the idea of the “Imago Dei” – the image of God – discussion (13). The imago dei represents a specific relationship between human beings and God, though the precise nature of that relationship is indeterminate. Some argue that the relationship describes the capacity shared by human beings and God to reign over animals; however, Wolterstorff immediately rejects this understanding as a possible source of human values, for any capacities approach is doomed to fail. Instead, Wolterstroff proposes a second account of this relationship: “a nature-resemblence” (14). Introducing this form of the imago dei argument proves key to Wolterstorff’s task, for the idea of a human nature will necessarily include all human beings (regardless of capacities), and only human beings! Although now close to a possible grounding human rights, Wolterstroff has not yet succeeded fully in his task. The involvement of human nature will prove necessary, but “possessing human nature cannot, all by itself, ground human rights” (15), as there is not yet any added dignity; Wolterstorff must go a bit further to explain how this nature-resemblance fits into a more meaningful relationship with God that does create a value capable of grounding human rights.
Where then do we gain this necessary value? Wolterstorff concludes that our “being loved by God does the work required” (16). Not just any type of love will work, Wolterstorff notes: “if God’s love of human beings is to account for the worth that grounds human rights, that love has to impart to them a worth that otherwise they would not have” (18). What sort of love accomplishes this? Wolterstorff identifies this sort of love as the love of attachment, or of friendship. When God befriends us, he bestows upon as an honor, and “to be honored is to have worth bestowed upon one… to be honored is to acquire new ways of being demeaned, new ways of being wronged, a new ground for respect; and that’s possible only if there has been some alteration in one’s worth” (19).
Here we finally see how this form of attachment-style love, combined with the idea of human nature will satisfy all three essential requirements of a grounding of human rights. Insofar as we possess the Imago Dei, that is insofar as human nature shares a fundamental resemblance to God’s own nature, we possess the “potential for friendship” with God (19). Furthermore, the friendship with which God does honor us, imparts upon us a fundamental dignity and new value. This added value, which all humans do possess, and which only humans can possess, grounds our human rights.
Upon his visit to Colgate, teachers and students accused Wolterstorff’s argument of amounting to nothing more than a dressed up capacities-argument. This issue took root in the idea of the “potential for friendship” supposedly possessed by human beings. Is not this “potential for friendship” the same as a “capacity for friendship”? It seems that in order for us to be friends with God, we must be capable of being friends with God. Furthermore, it would seem that not all human beings are capable of such friendship (e.g. coma patients, severely mentally disabled, infants), in which case this grounding of human rights would necessarily fail, as all capacities arguments do.
In his earlier papers, Wolterstorff did not sufficiently emphasize the importance of the fact that the human “potential” for freedom does not represent a capacity, but instead represents a fundamental characteristic or property of their very nature or their very essence. This potential is an inherent quality of every human being, regardless of the degree of functionality in their other capacities; every human being possesses the essential human nature, and in that human nature is this potential for friendship with God. We need not earn this friendship; we need not have some ability or degree of ability that makes us worthy of God’s friendship. Just by nature of our being human, we have the potential to be befriended by God. To reiterate the key point above, what enables friendship between God and man is the nature-resemblance between God and man. God sees human beings as somehow essentially similar to him, and in that similarity, he sees a potential for friendship. In his modified paper, Wolterstroff does a much better job clarifying this key distinction between “potential” and “capacity” for friendship.
At this point it is important for us to bear in mind an essential piece of Wolterstorff’s argument: the mere potential for friendship does not produce the value grounding our human rights. This potential is necessary to, but not sufficient for a grounding of human rights. Instead, the fact that God does befriend us is what confers upon us that essential dignity.
Here again we enter the realm of dispute Colgate professors and students, and Wolterstorff: if it is not some capacity that human beings have that make us deserving of friendship with God, then his choosing us as friends is entirely arbitrary. Wolterstorff addresses this very objection in his modified chapter: is it “purely whimsical and arbitrary on God’s part to choose human beings as the creatures with whom he wants to be friends[?] Might God just as well have chosen, say, crocodiles?” (20). With this juxtaposition of human beings and a specific alternative species of animal, Wolterstorff is able to remind us more clearly of the importance of our human natures to his whole argument: “human nature and imago dei are not irrelevant to an account of human dignity. They make it understandable that God would choose human beings for friendship and not the non-human animals. Given our nature, we have the potential for friendship; given their nature, they do not” (20). Wolterstorff makes the additional case against the arbitrariness of God’s choice when he explains why God does befriend us: “The explanation for God’s wanting to be friends with us is presumably much like the explanation for why we want to be friends with some fellow human being. We seek to become friends with someone not because we think he merits it, not because his worth requires it. We seek to become friends because we anticipate that our friendship will be a significant good in the lives of both of us” (21). Humans were not chosen for some estimable accomplishment, or superior capacity, they were chosen simply because “to be a friend with God one has to be a person. [And] crocodiles at their best cannot be persons… only humans [can]” (20).
Perhaps Wolterstorff should not have uttered the word “person,” for it essentially reopens all of the arguments mentioned above, and more. Does not “personhood” represent a capacity, as Lynn Rudder Baker suggests in her definition of personhood as the capacity for a first-person perspective? And wouldn’t this suggest that someone on life-support would not qualify? Furthermore, doesn’t it seem arbitrary that God chose human beings to have this personhood and no other species of animal? But I believe that Wolterstorff mentioned personhood so to try and shed a bit more light on what he really means by human nature. Furthermore, it is not clear that “person” must be defined as a first-person perspective; likely Wolterstorff intends to define personhood as something relatively abstract and attributable to every human being.[1]
Probably he should have left the word “person” out entirely, or at the very least offered a definition of what he meant. But I think that he could still argue against these two reiterated objections. Firstly, personhood as he means it is not a capacity, but simply a quality of our human natures that resembles a quality in God’s nature. This resemblance inspires God to recognize the potential for friendship. The second objection holds no real weight. Assuming God wanted friends, he had to choose some species to have the potential for friendship; humans just happened to be the one species that did develop personhood. Perhaps there could have been more species, perhaps not; but in this case, Wolterstorff would certainly push the burden of proof onto the one accusing arbitrariness.
This theistic grounding of human rights satisfies all of the necessary requirements of a human rights account. And yet, as Wolterstorff admits, this version is only a hypothetical, for unless you do believe in God, then this grounding will hold no weight. This mirrors the issue resulting from nearly every theistic philosophical argument; any time you introduce God, you immediately limit your audience to theists. This leads to a different sort of issue with his account – a functional issue regarding the treatment of human beings in general. Wolterstorff’s theistic account of human rights, while a thorough philosophical argument, offers no real contribution to the actual, practical grounding of human rights in the world, for it holds weight only with the world’s theistic population. Perhaps this problem, which necessarily results from all theistic philosophy, is what inspired Wolterstorff to take up the cause of religious arguments in public debate. Insofar as he champions the idea that we ought all at least to listen to one another respectfully, despite our personal beliefs I find such a cause admirable; however, as long as there are people who do not believe in God, I can only conclude that little of practical utility might come from theistic philosophy.[2]
12/17/09
[1] This also raises an issue that I cannot quite seem to shake: what if there are aliens who are persons. Would they then qualify for “human rights”? Would they share in this potential for friendship? Maybe they would have their own martian rights that would be essentially equivalent to human rights.
[2] Nevertheless, I enjoyed the course and learned a lot. It definitely contributed to my philosophical education, and I was struck by how thorough and rigourous theistic philosophical arguments tend to be – probably due to the very fact that they are immediately judged more critically due to their religious commitments.
No comments:
Post a Comment